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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
From its inception, the multilateral trading system has been focused on trade in goods.
Hence, from 1947 through the Tokyo Round, services were not covered in successive rounds
of trade negotiations.  The Uruguay Round, and the subsequent launch of the WTO, changed
this.  They brought an incorporation of services into the multilateral trading system under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  However, the actual degree of
liberalization has been relatively limited, with many of the GATS schedules involving simple
stand-still commitments (or less).  It is generally recognized that there still remains significant
scope for liberalization in the service sectors.
This paper is concerned with the analytical implications of service-sector liberalization, and in
particular the role of market structure. We focus here explicitly on cross-border trade in
services, and the interaction of international trade with market structure and public regulation.
Of course, in many ways the insights from the theoretical literature on international trade
apply equally to goods and services.  This is particularly true for cross-border trade.  There
are, however, some important differences.  One is the role of which has important analytical
implications.  The significance of proximity for service transactions means that “trade” in the
case of services often requires a mix of cross-border transactions and local establishment (i.e.,
FDI).  The importance of trade through affiliates is illustrated, for the case of the United
States.  The United States is the leading service exporter, with $245.7 billion in 1998.  The
level of U.S. service sales through affiliates (establishment trade) is comparable.
Establishment sales amounted to $258 billion in 1997, which compares to $240 billion in
direct exports.
The empirical and operational importance of establishment leads to a second important
difference between goods and services. This is an institutional difference.  While the GATT
emphasizes barriers at the border (tariffs, quotas, etc.), the GATS has a different focus.  From
the outset, it has emphasized both cross-border barriers and barriers to local establishment.
Consequently, the GATS blurs trade and investment restrictions, and covers both trade and
investment rules to the extent that they limit market access in service sectors.
Given the structure of the GATS, negotiations involve parallel commitments on cross-border
trade and local establishment by foreign service providers.  We argue in this paper that these
two modes (a simplification of the four modes actually listed in the GATS) can carry different
implications for national welfare, market structure, profits, and related metrics tied to trade
liberalization. In particular, given imperfect competition in services (often in conjunction with
domestic regulation), realization of gains from trade liberalization is tied closely to issues of
market regulation and market structure. This in turn means that assessment of services
commitments should take into account market structure and regulatory issues that affect the
degree of competition.
Our results point to important linkages between the degree of competition, the mode and
degree of market access, and the pro-competitive effects of liberalization. When we introduce
establishment in conjunction with low cross-border barriers, we find that the foreign service
provider takes on the domestic cartel.  This is clearly a pro-competitive result.  At higher
levels of cross-border trade barriers, establishment may instead lead to an equilibrium where
the foreign sector is simply co-opted into the domestic cartel.  This has well known negative
consequences related to profit shifting. The impact of establishment on the degree of
competition, and on potential gains or losses from liberalization, hinges on the underlying
degree of competition (a regulatory issue), but also on barriers to cross-border trade.
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1 OVERVIEW
From its inception, the multilateral trading system has been focused on trade in goods.
Hence, from 1947 through the Tokyo Round, services were not covered in successive rounds
of trade negotiations.  The Uruguay Round, and the subsequent launch of the WTO, changed
this.  They brought an incorporation of services into the multilateral trading system under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  However, the actual degree of
liberalization has been relatively limited, with many of the GATS schedules involving simple
stand-still commitments (or less).  It is generally recognized that there still remains
significant scope for liberalization in the service sectors.
This paper is concerned with the analytical implications of service-sector
liberalization, and in particular the role of market structure. The trade theory literature has
traditionally focused on trade in goods, with the literature on international trade in services
being a relatively limited and recent addition.  [See, for example, Francois (1990a), Hoekman
(1994), Markusen (1988,1989), Sampson and Snape (1985), Stern and Hoekman, (1988),
Francois and Schuknecht (1999).]  In addition, while there is a sizable empirical literature on
service sector policy and deregulation, this is largely focused on domestic deregulation. 1  In
                                                
1 A thorough overview is provided by WTO (1998).
2contrast, we focus here explicitly on cross-border trade in services, and the interaction of
international trade with market structure and public regulation. 2
Of course, in many ways the insights from the theoretical literature on international
trade apply equally to goods and services.  This is particularly true for cross-border trade.
There are, however, some important differences.  One is the role of proximity (see Francois,
1990b; Sampson and Snape, 1985), which has important analytical implications.  The
significance of proximity for service transactions means that “trade” in the case of services
often requires a mix of cross-border transactions and local establishment (i.e., FDI).  The
importance of trade through affiliates is illustrated, for the case of the United States, in
Table 1.  The United States is the leading service exporter, with $245.7 billion in 1998.  The
level of U.S. service sales through affiliates (establishment trade) is comparable.
Establishment sales amounted to $258 billion in 1997, which compares to $240 billion in
direct exports.
The empirical and operational importance of establishment leads to a second
important difference between goods and services. This is an institutional difference.  While
the GATT emphasizes barriers at the border (tariffs, quotas, etc.), the GATS has a different
focus.  From the outset, it has emphasized both cross-border barriers and barriers to local
establishment.  Consequently, the GATS blurs trade and investment restrictions, and covers
both trade and investment rules to the extent that they limit market access in service sectors.
Given the structure of the GATS, negotiations involve parallel commitments on cross-
border trade and local establishment by foreign service providers.  We argue in this paper that
these two modes (a simplification of the four modes actually listed in the GATS) can carry
different implications for national welfare, market structure, profits, and related metrics tied
to trade liberalization. In particular, given imperfect competition in services (often in
conjunction with domestic regulation), realization of gains from trade liberalization is tied
closely to issues of market regulation and market structure.3  This in turn means that
assessment of services commitments should take into account market structure and regulatory
issues that affect the degree of competition.
                                                
2 An exception is Cho (1988), who discusses Korean-U.S. negotiations on insurance and the
implications of the Korean insurance cartel for the gains from trade in insurance services
3 Competition in service sectors can also have important implications for trade in goods.  For example,
cartels in the international transportation sector can pose a significant barrier to trade in goods
(Francois and Wooton, 1999).  In addition, the presence of transport costs typically means prices are
not fully transmitted across markets (i.e., markets are segmented).  This has important implications for
trade and competition linkages.   
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we provide some
background and motivation.  In Section 3 we develop a stylized model of trade in services,
involving alternatively establishment or cross-border trade.  In Section 4 we then examine
liberalization of trade and establishment restrictions.  Finally, our results are summarized in
Section 5.
2 BACKGROUND
As noted by Hill (1977), a critical distinction between goods and services is that services are
consumed as they are produced.  As a result of the flow nature of the transaction, service
transactions hence involve an interaction between user and provider.  Based on this element
of interaction between user and provider, Sampson and Snape (1985) draw a distinction
between services that require physical proximity, and those that do not.  The GATS also
recognizes this distinction, in that it covers trade that requires no direct proximity (the cross-
border mode) and trade that involves proximity (the modes of movement of providers,
movement of consumers, and foreign establishment).  The most important distinction across
the four types is cross-border versus local supply of services.
While GATS commitments relate to these four modes, there are also overlapping
commitments in other areas under the WTO umbrella.  For example, the code on government
procurement provides scope for government commitments on market access to domestic
service markets, to the extent that they supply the procurement market.  In addition, the rules
on trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), to the extent that they touch on service
operations, also provide scope for overlapping commitments.
Critically, while competition policy is not formally a part of the WTO structure,
competition also has an important role to play in market access.  WTO members have
recognized that competition policy can be relevant to the extent that it impinges on
commitments made within the WTO.  Hence, the recent U.S.-Japan dispute over
photographic film hinged on the degree of competition in the distribution sector, while
threatened U.S. action in the 1990s on Japanese auto imports also emphasizes competition in
the domestic distribution and sales network.  Though these touch indirectly on market access
in services, there are also more direct links between competition and market access in
services.
Traditionally, many of the service sectors – like banking, telecommunications, air
transport, and insurance – have been heavily regulated.  This regulation has sometimes, as in
the case of PTTs, been undertaken in conjunction with state-sanctioned monopoly or outright
4ownership.  More recently, there has been a move toward deregulation and divestment of
state ownership.  While the most visible example may be telecommunications, similar moves
are occurring in the banking and other sectors.  For this reason, GATS-related negotiations on
services have taken and will take place in the context of domestic regulatory changes, and in
a climate of imperfect competition.
3 THE MODEL
To explore some of these issues, we start with a simple model of a domestic service sector
that is imperfectly competitive.  The domestic oligopoly faces competition from a cross-
border firm.   The domestic industry is protected from foreign competition. Within this
framework, we examine the implications of lowering these barriers and giving the foreign
firm open access to consumers through granting the firm the right of establishment in the
domestic country.
3.1 Basic Structure
Formally, consider the market for a homogeneous service S in the home (h) country.  This
service is provided by n identical domestic firms within a regulated industry, as well as by a
single foreign (f) firm based overseas and facing barriers to serving the domestic consumers.
The inverse demand for the service relates the market price to the total quantity supplied to
the market (the sum of the outputs of the home firms and the foreign firm):
( )h fp x y nq q= - + (1)
The revenues of the two types of firm are derived directly from the demand curve (1).
( ) , for ,i h f iR x y nq q q i h fé ù= - + =ë û (2)
Home firms face a constant marginal cost c, while the foreign firm additionally has to
pay t to provide the service to home consumers. This cost may reflect cross-borer taxes, but is
better viewed as a result of regulatory and other barriers to foreign operations in the home
market.  The foreign firm may, of course, also sell services in a third market.  We are
effectively assuming market segmentation here, which combined with the constant marginal
cost assumption lets us proceed with the model developed in this section. Consequently, total
costs and marginal costs of the two types of firms are, respectively,
5( )
h h h
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(3)
The marginal revenue of the foreign firm is determined by the partial differentiation
of (2), imposing the Cournot assumption that firms set quantity strategically, while assuming
no subsequent reaction by competing forms (that is, / 0h fq q¶ ¶ = ).  The firm’s perceived
marginal revenue is:
( )2f h fMR x y nq q= - + (4)
Equating marginal revenue to marginal cost for the foreign firm yields the reaction function:
( ) ( )
2
h
f h
x c t ynq
q q
y
- + -
= (5)
The marginal revenues of the home firms will depend on the assumed structure of the
home market.  Home firms are assumed to be regulated and the nature of this regulation is
crucial to the firms’ behavior.  To bound the range of effects, we adopt two polar assumptions
about regulation. The first is that the regulator ensures that the home firms behave
independently, engaging in pure Cournot competition with both their domestic and foreign
rivals.  The other extreme is to assume that the domestic regulator promotes collusion on the
part of home firms, such that they act as a cartel.  In either situation, the foreign firm is at first
assumed to be a Cournot competitor.4  We shall consider, below, the implications of the
foreign firm being welcomed as a new member in the cartel.
Consider firstly the perceived marginal revenue for a representative, non-cooperative
home firm (labeled hn), whose Cournot assumption is that its domestic and foreign rivals will
not change their outputs in response to its output change
( / / 0, forhk hj f hjq q q q k j¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ = ¹ ):
( )1hn h fMR x y n q qé ù= - + +ë û (6)
where, using symmetry, it is assumed that all home firms choose the same level of output.
The corresponding reaction function for a non-cooperative individual home firm is:
                                                
4 We assume Cournot competition rather than Bertrand, as the latter would result in the competition
between the foreign and home firms driving the price to the competitive level.
6( ) ( )1
f
hn f
x c yq
q q
n y
- -
=
+
(7)
This can be contrasted with the behavior of the representative firm (labeled hc) that is
part of a regulated cartel.  This firm acts in collaboration with the other home firms, each
adjusting output by the same anticipated amount.  Consequently the perceived marginal
revenue of a representative cooperative home firm is:
( )2hc h fMR x nq q= - + (8)
The corresponding reaction function is:
( )
2
f
hc f
x c yq
q q
ny
- -
= (9)
3.2 Output Equilibria
The foreign firm’s reaction function (5) can be interacted with each of the home country’s
two possible reaction functions, (7) and (9), to solve for the market equilibrium in the non-
cooperative and cartel cases, respectively.  When the home firms compete with both domestic
and foreign firms, the equilibrium output levels are:
( )
( )
( )
*
2
1
*
2
hn
fn
x c t
q
n y
x c n t
q
n y
- +
=
+
- - +
=
+
(10)
In the case of cartel behavior on the part of the home firms, the firms’ equilibrium levels of
output are:
*
3
2
*
3
hc
fc
x c t
q
ny
x c t
q
y
- +
=
- -
=
(11)
The reaction functions and the corresponding production equilibria are illustrated in
Figure 1.  As should be expected, home firms supply more when they act non-cooperatively.
7The foreign firm is able to free ride on the restrictive behavior of the cartel, selling a greater
equilibrium quantity than when the home firms behave non-cooperatively.
4 INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND MARKET ACCESS
We now consider the implications for consumer welfare and the profitability of firms when
the competitive structure of the service industry is changed as a result of commitments to
liberalize market-access conditions.  This change can arise either through giving the foreign
firm better market access or through forcing home firms to act more competitively.
4.1 Improving Cross-border Access
Market access for the foreign firm is improved by reducing t, the impediment the firm faces
in servicing the home market from abroad.  The foreign firm would be accorded national
treatment if t = 0, equivalent to the firm having the right of establishment in the home market
where it would compete on an equal footing with the domestic firms.  We shall, later, discuss
the potential for the foreign firm being admitted to the domestic cartel.
We can solve for the price of the service when the domestic firms in the home country
behave non-cooperatively by substituting the equilibrium outputs (10) into the inverse
demand function (1), yielding:
( )1
*
2n
x n c t
p
n
- + +
=
+
(12)
Profits of a firm are the difference between its revenues (2) and its costs (3):
, for ,i i iR C i h fp = - = (13)
Thus, equilibrium profits are calculated by substituting (10) into (13):
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
2
2
2
*
2
1
*
2
hn
fn
x c t
n y
x c n t
n y
p
p
- +
=
+
- - +é ùë û=
+
(14)
Figure 2a illustrates the effects of reducing the trade barrier t on price *np , profits of
the foreign firm *fnp , and profits of the home industry *hnP  (n times the profits of an
8individual firm *hnp , where n = 2 in these simulations).  The higher the barrier to the foreign
firm, the smaller its market share and its profits, while the domestic firms enjoy a higher level
of profitability.  The market price rises with the barrier—home firms face less competition
from abroad resulting in a less competitive price.  When the trade barrier is eliminated, all
firms compete on an equal basis and receive the same level of profits (so that the profits of
the home industry are n times that of the foreign firm).
Similar calculations can be made for the equilibrium price and profit levels when the
regulated home firms behave as a cartel by substituting the equilibrium output levels (11) into
(1) for the price:
2
*
3c
x c t
p
+ +
= (15)
and into (13) for firms' profit levels:
( )
( )
2
2
*
9
2
*
9
hc
fc
x c t
ny
x c t
y
p
p
- +
=
- -
=
(16)
Figure 2b shows the impact of trade-barrier reduction on the price *cp , foreign firm's
profits *fcp , and the profits of the cartelized home industry * *hc hcnP p= (where n is again
assumed to be equal to 2).  In large respect, the lines are the same as those for the non-
cooperative home industry, illustrated in Figure 2a.  The principal difference is that, when all
barriers are eliminated (giving the foreign firm equal access to the market) the foreign firm
and the home industry have equal market shares.  This is because the domestic firms behave
as if they were a single firm.
4.2 Domestic Competition Policy
We turn next to competition policy.  Within our setup, a logical instrument to simulate the
effects of domestic regulation is n, the number of home firms.  If we calculate the equilibria
for a cartel and for a competitive single home firm (that is n = 1), we get the same outcome.
Consequently, we can determine the impact of forcing a cartelized home industry to behave
9more competitively by calculating the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome for increasing
values of n, between 1 and the actual number of firms in the industry. 5
We illustrate the results of this exercise in Figure 3.  In the figure, the equilibrium
price *np  and the profits of the foreign firm *fnp  and the home industry *hnP  are shown as
a function of n, the number of firms in the home industry.  The foreign firm faces a barrier to
trade and hence will always have a lower level of profitability than its home counterpart in
the domestic market.  However, it will have higher profits, the fewer home firms that it has to
compete with.  Profits of the home industry are not monotonic in the number of home firms.
Two home firms grab a larger share of the market than does a cartel so that, even though the
overall market is more competitive, the home industry in total is better off with the increased
competition.  Larger numbers of non-cooperative home firms will, however, drive down
overall profits in the market and lower the total profits of the home firms, despite their
increased share of sales.
4.3 The Camel's Nose Under the Tent (Admitting the Foreigner into the Cartel)
We next consider establishment and the possibility of letting the foreigner into the cartel.
Given the domestic cartel, establishment poses the immediate question—should the foreign
firm be admitted into the cartel?  This is a solution that has been followed in practice.
Examples include the Korean and Swiss insurance industry responses in the face of U.S.
pressure (See Cho 1988 on Korea).  Within our framework, the interest of the foreign firm in
agreeing to such an arrangement proves to hinge on the size of trading costs.
Given establishment, when is it in the interests of any of the parties for the foreign
firm to be admitted into the domestic cartel?  We consider the earnings of firms at various
trade costs, both when the foreign firm is in competition with the cartel (subscripted, as
before, by c) and when it has been admitted as a full participant in the restrictive agreement
(subscripted by a).  The results are illustrated in Figure 4, where the number of home firms is
again set at 2.
It is clear that, in the case illustrated, when the trade costs ( 2t t> ) are high the cartel
wants to keep the foreign firm out, while the foreign firm would like to have the right of
establishment, even as part of the cartel.  At middle trade costs ( 1 2t t t< < ), the home cartel is
feeling increased pressure on its profits from the increasingly competitive foreign firm.  The
                                                
5 This technique was used by the authors in Francois and Wooton (1999) in their discussion of
shipping conferences and maritime trade.  Also see Francois and Horn (1998).
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cartel would therefore like to admit the foreign firm to the cartel, an option that the foreign
firm also prefers.  At low trade costs ( 1t t< ), the foreign firm would rather compete with the
home cartel than be a part of it.  The consumer always appears to lose from the formation of
the cartel, even if it avoids trade costs in the process of admitting the foreign firm.
The interest of a domestic industry, in terms of favoring or opposing a foreign right of
establishment, will depend on the conditions for cross-border access.  The industry’s position
can be reversed as cross-border restrictions are negotiated down.  This is because, given
erosion of market power through trade, the domestic industry may find it advantageous to co-
opt the foreign sector by inviting them into the cartel and sharing rents.  Once cross-border
barriers are sufficiently low, however, the foreign view of establishment is that they prefer to
play against, rather than with, the cartel. The effect of establishment on competition hence
depends on cross-border access.  With high trading costs, establishment may reduce welfare
through profit shifting.
5 SUMMARY
The GATS places emphasis on two broad modes of trade—cross-border (i.e., international)
trade and trade through local establishments.  Cross-border trade includes movement of
service providers, movement of consumers, and cross-border sales.  Hence, in contrast to
trade in goods, GATS-based negotiations take place on the dual margins of trade and
investment concessions.  Our approach in this paper has been to work with a formal model of
oligopoly to examine the effects of market-access concessions for domestic and foreign firms
and for domestic consumers.  We have argued that the relative benefits of cross-border and
establishment-related market-access concessions hinge critically on underlying issues of
regulation and market structure.  In particular, the interests of the domestic and foreign
industry will depend, in part, on the impact that trade has on the market power of domestic
firms.
We summarize our analytical results in three groupings: rather obvious, somewhat
less obvious, and even less obvious. The last set of results constitutes the substantive
contribution of the paper. On the rather obvious front, given an imperfectly competitive
industry (alternatively Cournot or perfect collusion), less market access (i.e., greater
restrictions) implies the following: the foreign service provider will have a smaller market
share and profits; domestic service providers will have higher profitability; and home firms
face less competition from abroad resulting in a higher home market price.
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Moving to somewhat less obvious results, we have shown that when we consider the
effect of a regulatory environment that tolerates collusion among a small number of domestic
firms, less competition has the following implications: the foreign firm will have higher
profits the less competitive the domestic industry; profits of the home industry are not
monotonic in the number of home firms;  and initial moves away from monopoly can actually
boost the market share and profits of the total domestic industry.
Even less obvious (and the main lesson to carry from our analytics) is the incentive
for bringing a foreign firm into a dometic cartel.  This involves establishment, and hinges on
the set of results outlined above.  It yields the following results:
- When the trade costs are high, a domestic cartel wants to keep the foreign firm
out (it opposes establishment), while the foreign firm would like to have the
right of establishment, even as part of the cartel.
- At more moderate trade costs, both the home and foreign firms favor bringing
the foreign firm into the domestic cartel.
- At low trade costs, the foreign firm would rather compete with the home cartel
than be a part of it.
Collectively, these last results point to linkages between the degree of competition, the mode
and degree of market access, and the pro-competitive effects of liberalization.  When we
introduce establishment in conjunction with low cross-border barriers, we find that the
foreign service provider takes on the domestic cartel.  This is clearly a pro-competitive result.
At higher levels of cross-border trade barriers, establishment may instead lead to an
equilibrium where the foreign sector is simply co-opted into the domestic cartel.  This has
well known negative consequences related to profit shifting.  The impact of establishment on
the degree of competition, and on potential gains or losses from liberalization, hinges on the
underlying degree of competition (a regulatory issue), but also on barriers to cross-border
trade.
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Figure 1  Equilibrium Output Levels
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Figure 2a  Improving Cross-border Access (non-cooperative home firms)
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Figure 2b  Improving Cross-border Access (home cartel)
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Figure 3  Encouraging Domestic Competition
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Figure 4  Choice of Regime
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Table 1
United States Cross-Border and Affiliate Trade in Services
U.S. cross-
border exports
U.S. cross-
border imports
U.S. foreign
sales through
affiliates
Foreign sales in
U.S. through
affiliatesYear
billions of dollars
1987 86.0 73.9 72.3 62.6
1988 100.1 81.0 83.8 73.2
1989 117.1 85.3 99.2 94.2
1990 136.2 98.2 121.3 109.2
1991 151.2 99.9 131.6 119.5
1992 162.3 100.4 140.6 128.0
1993 170.6 107.9 142.6 134.7
1994 186.0 119.1 159.1 145.4
1995 202.2 128.2 190.1 149.7
1996 221.1 137.1 223.2 168.4
1997 240.4 152.4 258.3 205.0
1998 245.7 165.3
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1999.
